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Abstract
This is a paper on the creation and evolution of conventions of be-
havior in ”inter-generational games”. In these games a sequence of non-
overlapping ”generations” of players play a stage game for a ﬁnite number
of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game
in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t are
allowed to see the history of the game played by all (or some subset) of
the generations who played it before them and can communicate with their
successors in generation t+1 and advise them on how they should behave.
What we ﬁnd is that word-of-mouth social learning (in the form of
advice from laboratory “parents” to laboratory “children”) can be a strong
force in the creation of social conventions, far stronger than the type of
learning subjects seem capable of doing simply by learning the lessons of
history without the guidance oﬀered by such advice.
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This is a paper on the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in “inter-
generational games”. In these games a sequence of non-overlapping “generations”
of players play a stage game for a ﬁnite number of periods and are then replaced
by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of
time. Players in generation t are allowed to see the history of the game played
by all (or some subset) of the generations who played it before them and can
communicate with their successors in generation t+1 and advise them on how
they should behave. Hence, when a generation t player goes to move she has both
history and advice at her disposal. In addition, players care about the succeeding
generation in the sense that each generation’s payoﬀ is a function not only of the
payoﬀs achieved during their generation but also of the payoﬀs achieved by their
children in the game that is played after they retire. 12
Our motivation for studying such games comes from the idea that while much
of game theoretical research on convention creation has focused on the problem of
how inﬁnitely lived agents inter-act when they repeatedly play the same game with
each other over time, this problem is not the empirically relevant one. Rather, as
we look at the world around us we notice that while many of the games we see
may have inﬁnite lives the agents who play these games are ﬁnitely lived and play
these games for a relatively short period of time. When they retire or die they are
replaced by others who then carry on. When these transitions take place, each
agent transmits all of the information about the norms and conventions that have
been established to their successors.
1We use a non-overlapping generation structure and not an overlapping generations one be-
cause in most overlapping generation games of this type (see Salant (1991), Kandori (1989),
Cremer (1986)) cooperation is achieved by each generation realizing that they must be nice to
their elders since they will be old one day and if the current young see them acting improperly
toward their elders, they will not provide for them in their old age. The analysis is backward
looking in that each generation cares about the generation coming up behind them and acts
properly now knowing that they are being observed and will inter-act directly with that gen-
eration. In this literature, folk-like theorems are proven if the length of the overlap between
generations is long enough. In our work, however, generations never overlap. What they do is
hope to behave correctly so that their children will see them as an example and act appropriately
toward each other. Since they care about their children, adjacent generations are linked via their
utility functions but not directly through strategic interaction . Hence, our model is a limiting
type of overlapping generations model where the overlap is either minimal or non-existent..
2Except for the use of advice and the inter-dependence of our generational payoﬀs, our game
has many of the features of Kalai and Jackson’s (1996) Recurring Games.
2As we will see in the Battle of the Sexes Game studied here, the result of this
cultural transmission may be a perpetuation of social and economic inequality
or what Edna Ullman-Margalit (1977) calls a ”norm of partiality” in which an
equilibrium with uneven asymmetric payoﬀsi se s t a b l i s h e da st h en o r mo fb e h a v i o r
for a group of people and passed on as the status quo from generation to generation
through a process of socialization. For example, any situation involving a network
externality is a candidate for such a norm. Examples here include the common
adoption of the Windows operating system as opposed to Unix, the QWERTY
keyboard, VHS video format etc. All of these confer unequal beneﬁts to agents in
the economy and perpetuate a status quo. Other examples include occupational
segregation by sex where, certain occupations come to be predominantly female,
seniority rules where privileges are conferred on certain people because of their
years of service (a characteristic that may or may not be correlated with current
merit) and any other situation where privileges or property rights are awarded
arbitrarily to some subset of the population and these privileges are perpetuated
over time.
The evolutionary model we have in mind is more Lamarckian than Darwinian
in that while Lamarck had the wrong model of biological evolution, believing
that animals could pass on acquired traits to their successors, such a model may
be a correct model of social evolution where generations of social agents pass
on conventions of behavior they create during their lifetime to their successors.
34Such conventions may reinforce social inequality
3Our emphasis on this Lamarckian evolutionary process is in contrast to practically all work
in evolutionary game theory which is predominantly Darwinian (see, for example, Kandori,
Malaith and Rob (1993) , Samuelson (1997), Vega-Redondo (1996) and Weibull (1995) just to
name a few). In this literature conventions are depicted as the equilibrium solution to some
recurrent problem or game that social agents face. More precisely, in these models agents are
depicted as non-thinking programs (genes) hard-wired to behave in a particular manner. These
agents either inter-act randomly or ”play the ﬁeld”. The dynamics of the growth and or decay
of these strategies is governed by some type of replicator-like dynamic (see Weibull (1995)) in
which those strategies which receive relatively high payoﬀs increase in the population faster than
those which receive relatively low payoﬀs. The focus of attention in this literature is on the long
run equilibria attained by the dynamic. Does it contain a mixture of strategies or types? Is any
particular strategy by itself an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS)? Are there cycles in which
diﬀerent strategies over run the population for a while and then die out only to be replaced by
others later on?
An exception to this strand of work, is the work of Jackson and Kalai (1997) on recurring
games which have a structure very close to our inter-generational games except for the inter-
generational communication and caring.
4Of course this point has already been made by Boyd and Richerson , (1985) , Cavalli Sforza
3What we ﬁnd is that word-of-mouth social learning (in the form of advice from
parents to children) can be a strong force in the creation of social conventions,
far stronger than the type of learning subjects seem capable of doing simply by
learning the lessons of history without the guidance oﬀered by such advice. Put
diﬀerently, we ﬁnd that in terms of coordinating subject behavior, having access
to both parental advice and the complete history of the game being played is quite
eﬃcient, while having access only to history is inadequate. (I.e. subjects coordi-
nate their behavior over half the time when they both get advice and see history
while they coordinate less than one third of the time when they are deprived of
advice). Eliminating a subject’s access to history while preserving his or her abil-
ity to get advice seems to have little impact on their ability to coordinate. Hence,
in our inter-generational setting, it appears as if advice is a crucial element in the
creation and evolution of social conventions, an element that has been given little
attention in the past literature.
In addition to highlighting the role played by social learning in social evolu-
tion, the data generated by our experiments exhibit many of the stylized facts of
social evolution, i.e., punctuated equilibria, socialization, and social inertia. What
this means is that during the experiment social conventions appear to emerge over
time, are passed on from generation to generation through the socializing inﬂuence
of advice, and then spontaneously seem to disappear only to emerge in another
form later in the experiment. (Such punctuated equilibria are also seen in the
theoretical work of Young (1996, 1998) where people learn by sampling the popu-
lation of agents who have played before and then make errors in best-responding
to what they have learned.) Some behavior is quite persistent taking a long time
to disappear despite its dysfunctional character.
In this paper we will proceed as follows: Section 2 presents our experimental
design. In Section 3 we present the results of our experiments by ﬁrst describing
how our results illustrate the three properties of social evolution we are interested
in: punctuated equilibrium, socialization and inertia. Section 4 is about social
learning. It describes what happens in our experiments when we eliminate our
subject’s ability to pass on advice or see the history of their predecessors. Finally,
in Section 5 we oﬀer some conclusions and speculations for future work.
and Feldman (1981) and more recently Bisin (1998), all of whom have presented a number of
intersting models where imitation and socialization, rather than pure aboslute biological ﬁtness,
is the criterion upon which strategies evolve. We would include Young’s (1996, 1998) work in
this category as well.
42. The Experiment: Design and Procedures
2.1. General Features
The general features of our inter-generational Battle of the Sexes Game were as
follows: Subjects once recruited were ordered into generations. Each generation
played the game once and only once with an opponent. After their participation in
the game, subjects in any generation t are replaced by a next generation, t+1, who
were able to view some or all of the history of what has transpired before them.
Subjects in generation t were able to give advice to their successors by suggesting a
strategy and by explaining why such advice is being given. This feature obviously
permits socialization. The payoﬀs to any subject in the experiment were equal to
the payoﬀs earned by that generation during their lifetime plus a discounted payoﬀ
which depends on the payoﬀs achieved by their immediate successors. Finally,
during their participation in the game, subjects were asked to predict the actions
taken by their opponent (using a mechanism which makes telling the truth a
dominant strategy). This is done in an eﬀort to gain insight into the beliefs
existing at any time during the evolution of our experimental society.
The experiment was run at both the Experimental Economics Laboratory of
the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University or at the Ex-
perimental Lab in the Department of Economics at Rutgers University. Subjects
were recruited, typically in groups of 12, from undergraduate economics courses
and divided into two groups of six with which they stayed for the entire experi-
ment. During their time in the lab, for which they earned approximately an aver-
age of $26.10 for about 11
2 hours, they engaged in three separate inter-generational
games, a Battle of the Sexes Game (BOSG) , an Ultimatum Game(UG) in which
they were asked to divide 100 francs, and a Trust Game (TG) as deﬁned by Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). All instructions were presented on the computer
screens and questions were answered as they arose. (There were relatively few
questions so it appeared that the subjects had no problems understanding the
games being played which purposefully were quite simple). All subjects were
inexperienced in this experiment.
In this paper we only present the results of the following Battle of the Sexes
Game.5
5The actual experiment performed had three periods. In each period a subject would play
one of the three games with a diﬀerent opponent. For example, in period 1, Players 1 and 6
might play the Battle of the Sexes Game while Players 2 and 5 play the Ultimatum Game and
Players 3 and 4 play the Trust game. When they have ﬁnished their respective games, we would
5Battle of the Sexes Game
Column Player
12
Row Player 1 1 5 0 ,5 0 0 ,0
2 0, 0 50, 150
As is true in all BOSG’s, this game has two pure strategy equilibria. In one,
(1,1), player 1 does relatively well and receives a payoﬀ of 150 while player 2 does
less well and receives a payoﬀ of 50. In the other equilibrium, (2,2), just the
opposite is true. In disequilibrium all payoﬀs are zero. The convention creation
problem here is which equilibrium will be adhered to and the problem is that
b e c a u s ee a c ht y p eo fp l a y e rf a v o r sad i ﬀerent equilibrium there is an equity issue
which is exacerbated by our generational structure since new generations may not
want to adhere to a convention established in the past which is unfavorable to
them. (There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium which we will ignore for the
present and a coordinated alternating equilibrium which we see no evidence of in
our data.) The conversion rate of francs into dollars here is 1fr = $.04.
When subjects started to play the Battle of the Sexes Game, after reading the
speciﬁc instructions for that game, they would see on the screen the advice given
to them from the previous generation. In the BOSG this advice was in the form of
a suggested strategy (either 1 or 2) as well as a free-form message written by the
previous generational player oﬀering an explanation of why they suggested what
they did. No subjects could see the advice given to their opponent, but it was
known that each side was given advice. In the Baseline experiment, it was also
known that each generational player could scroll through the previous history of
the generations before it and see what each generational player of each type chose
and what payoﬀ they received. They could not see, however, any of the previous
advice given to their predecessors. Finally, before they made their strategy choice
they were asked to state their beliefs about what they thought was the probability
that their opponent would choose any one of his or her two strategies.
To get the subjects to report truthfully, subjects were paid for their predictions
according to a proper scoring rule which gave them an incentive to report their true
beliefs. More speciﬁcally before subjects chose strategies in any round, they were
rotate them in the next period so that in period 2 Players 2 and 4 play the Battle of the Sexes
Game while Players 3 and 6 play the Ultimatum Game and Players 1 and 5 play the Trust
game. The same type of rotation is carried out in period 3 so that at the end of the experiment
each subjects has played each game against a diﬀerent opponent who has not played with any
subject he has played with before.
6asked to enter into the computer the probability vector that they felt represented
their beliefs or predictions about the likelihood that their opponent would use
each of his of her pure strategies.6 We rewarded subjects for their beliefs in
experimental points which are converted into dollars at the end of the experiment
as follows:
First subjects report their beliefs by entering a vector r =( r1,r 2) indicating
their belief about the probability that the other subject will use strategy 1 or 2.7.
Since only one such strategy will actually be used, the payoﬀ to player i when
strategy 1 strategy is chosen by a subject’s opponent and r is the reported belief
vector of subject i will be:







The payoﬀ to subject i when strategy 2 is chosen is, analogously,







The payoﬀs from the prediction task were all received at the end of the experiment.
Note what this function says. A subject starts out with 20,000 points and
states a belief vector r =( r1,r 2). If their opponent chooses 1, then the subject
would have been best oﬀ if he or she had put all of their probability weight on 1.
The fact that he or she assigned it only r1 means that he or she has, ex post, made
a mistake. To penalize this mistake we subtract (100 − r1)2 from the subject’s
20,000 point endowment. Further, the subject is also penalized for the amount
he or she allocated to the other strategy, r2 by subtracting (r2)2 from his or her
20,000point endowment as well. (The same function applies symmetrically if 2
is chosen). The worst possible guess, i.e. predicting a particular pure strategy
only to have your opponent choose another, yields a payoﬀ of 0 . It can easily
be demonstrated that this reward function provides an incentive for subjects to
reveal their true beliefs about the actions of their opponents. 8Telling the truth is
optimal, however, this is true only if the subjects are risk neutral. Risk aversion
can lead subjects to make a ”secure” prediction and place a .50 probability of
each strategy. We see no evidence of this type of behavior.
We made sure that the amount of money that could potentially be earned in the
prediction part of the experiment was not large in comparison to the game being
6See Appendix 1 for the instructions concerning this part of the experiment.
7In the instructions rj is expressed as numbers in [0,100], so are divided by 100 to get
probabilities.
8An identical elicatation procedure was used successfully by Nyarko and Schotter (1999).
7played. (In fact, over the entire experiment subjects earned, on average, $26 while
the most they could earn on all of their predictions was $6.) The fear here was
that if more money could be earned by predicting well rather than playing well,
the experiment could be turned into a coordination game in which subjects would
have an incentive to coordinate their strategy choices and play any particular pure
strategy repeatedly so as to maximize their prediction payoﬀs at the expense of
their game payoﬀs. Again, absolutely no evidence of such coordination exists in
the data of the BOSG.
2.2. Parameter Speciﬁcation
The experiments performed can be characterized by four parameters. The ﬁrst the
length of the history that each generation t player is allowed to see. The second
is inter-generational discount rate indicating the fraction of the next generation’s
payoﬀ to be added to any give generational players payoﬀ. The third is the number
of period each generation lives for (i.e. the number of times they repeat the game)
while the fourth indicates whether advice is allowable between generations. In
all of our experiments each generation lives for one period or repeats the trust
game only once and has a discount rate of 1/2. Hence, they only diﬀer on the
basis of the length of history the subjects are allowed to view before playing
and whether the are able to get advice from their predecessor or not. In the
Baseline experiment subjects could pass advice to their successor and see the full
history of all generations before them. This Baseline experiment was run for 81
generations. However, at period 52 we took the history of play and started two
separate and independent new treatments at that point which generated a pair
of new histories. In Advice-only Treatment (Treatment I) before any generation
made its move it could see only the last generation’s history and nothing else. This
treatment isolated the eﬀect of advice on the play of the inter-generational game.
The History-only Treatment, Treatment II, was identical to the Baseline except
for the fact that no generation was able to pass advice onto their successors. They
could see the entire history, however, so that this treatment isolated the impact of
history. Advice-only Treatment was run for an additional 80 generations while the
History-only Treatment was run for an additional 66 generations, each starting
after generation 52 was completed in the Baseline. Hence, our Baseline was of
length 81, the Advice-only Treatment was of length 789 and the History-only
9One generation was lost because of a computer crash. The lost generation was the third
(last) period of a session. We were able to reconstrcut the relevant data ﬁles




We will analyze our results by ﬁrst seeing how they illustrate what we consider
to be the three basic stylized facts of social evolution: Punctuated equilibria,
Inertia, and Socialization. After this we investigate the role of social learning in
our experiment by taking a close look at the role played by advice.
3.1. Stylized Facts of Social Evolution
The stylized facts of social evolution which we wish to study in our experiment
are as follows.
1) Punctuated Equilibria:
If one looks at the history of various societies one sees certain regularities in
their development. First, as Peyton Young (1996) makes clear, over long periods
of time one observes periods of punctuated equilibria where certain conventions of
behavior are established, remain perhaps for long periods of time, but eventually
give way to temporary periods of chaos which then settle down into new equilibria.
10
In our experiments departures from equilibria are sometimes caused by the
advice handed down from one generation to the next. As we will see, there are
times during the experiment where a convention appears to be relatively ﬁrmly
established and yet there will be generational advice advocating a departure. In
addition, there will be periods where a convention also seems ﬁrmly established
and advice will be given to adhere to it only to be ignored. Each of these phe-
nomena causes a disruption in the chain of social learning that is passed on from
10There are a number of reasons for the disruption of these conventions. In Darwinian models
of evolution random mutations can arise which, if persistent enough, can cause a disruption of
the current equilibrium and drift towards a new one (see Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1996),
Young (1993), Fudenberg and Maskin (1990), Samuelson and Zhang (1992), and Samuelson
(1991). In Young’s (1996) model, the cause of disruption is not mutation but rather noise.
While various equilibria are more or less resistant to such shocks, noise or mutation can lead to
the disappearance, at last temporarily, of existing conventions of behavior.
9generation to generation and can cause spontaneous breakdowns of what appear
to be stable social conventions..
2) Socialization
Another stylized fact of social evolution that we wish to capture in our design
is the fact that such evolution is maintained by a process of socialization in which
present generations teach and pass on current conventions of behavior to the next
generation. 11
3) Inertia
Because so much behavior is tradition or convention based, there is a lot of
inertia built into human action. The world is as stable as it is because people are,
to some extent, blindly following the rules and conventions taught to them by
their parents or mentors. Social conventions are hard to disrupt as they are often
followed unthinkingly while they are sometimes hard to establish because people
seem overly committed to past patterns of behavior. Finally, if beliefs are sticky
or move sluggishly, inertia will be even harder to overcome since people will ﬁnd
it hard to learn from their mistakes in the past.
3.2. Results in The Baseline Experiment
S i n c ew ed e s i g n e do u re x p e r i m e n t st oa l l o wu st oo b s e r v en o to n l yt h ea c t i o n s
of subjects but their beliefs and the advice they give each other, let us present
these one at a time for the Baseline experiment. We will then go on to investigate
behavior in Treatments 1 and 2.
3.2.1. Actions in the Baseline Experiment: Punctuated Equilibria
Figure 2 presents the time series of actions generated by our 81 generation Baseline
experiment.
Figure 2 Here
11Replicator dynamics attempt this inter-generational transmission in a very speciﬁc and non-
human manner but as a descriptive theory of social reality such a theory is quite poor. Other
theories of social evolution, [see Boyd and Richerson (1985), Cavalli Sforza and Feldman (1981),
and Bisin and Verdier (1998)] use imitation as the socialization mechanism and in that sense
they are closer to the model we employ here, except for the fact that we will only model vertical
as opposed to horizontal socialization. Still, what we see in front of us in the real world are such
things as tradition and convention-based behavior which are taught and passed on explicitly by
one generation to another. It is this process we wish to capture in our experiments.
10Note that in this ﬁgure we have time on the horizontal axis and the actions
chosen by our generation pair on the vertical axis. Hence there are four possible
action pairs that we can observe o11 =( r o w 1,column 1), o12 =( r o w 1,column 2),o 21
=( r o w 2,column 1), o22 =( r o w 2,column 2),w h e r eo ij indicates an outcome where
the row player chose action i and the column player action j. .(We will denote
these states as states 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively).
To give a greater insight into the data we have divided the 81 generations into
regimes based on a simple inspection of the outcomes observed. Regime 1 consists
of period 1-25, regime 2, generations 26-45, regime 3, generations 46-66 and regime
4, generations 67-81. To support this separation we estimated a lmultinomial logit
model describing the probability of being in any state. This model demonstrates
that when we cross the boundaries of our proposed regimes, the probabilities of
being in the various states change dramatically and in a manner consistent with
our proposed regimes. This analysis will be presented below but ﬁrst let us look
more carefully at Figure 2.
Regime I (generations (1-25) we call the (2,2) Convention Regime since during
this time period we observed 17 periods in which the (2,2) equilibrium was chosen
along with one stretch of time where we observed nine consecutive periods of
(2,2), the longest run for any stage-game equilibrium in all 81 generations of the
Baseline. Regime II (generations 25-45) we call the (1,1) Convention Regime
because while in the ﬁrst 25 generations we only saw the (1,1) equilibrium chosen
twice, in Regime II it is chosen in 11 of the 21 generations. In addition, during
this time the (2,2) equilibrium, which was so prevalent in Regime I, appears only
once. If we look at the row players in this Regime II, they choose strategy 1, in 17
of the 21 generations indicating that at least in their minds they are adhering to
the (1,1) convention in playing this game. Regime III (generations 46-66) we call
a transition regime since the generational players spend most of their time in a
disequilibrium state with infrequent occurrences of the (1,1) equilibrium and the
(2,2) equilibrium (two and three respectively). It is interesting to note that during
this time the row player is starting to play strategy 2 more frequently (choosing
it 6 out of 21 times as opposed to 4 out of 21 times in Regime II). Finally, Regime
IV (generations 67-81), appears to present evidence that the (2,2) equilibrium is
reestablishing itself as a convention after a virtual absence over 42 generations. We
say this because during these last 15 rounds we see the (2,2) equilibrium appearing
in 10 out of 15 generations while it only appeared four times in the previous 42
rounds. Even more surprising, the row players, after a great resistance to playing
row 2, (e.g., they only played it 10 times in 42 generations between generation 25
11and 66), chose it 11 times in the last 15 rounds. In total there were 47 periods
of stage-game equilibrium played and 34 periods of stage-game disequilibrium.
Note ﬁnally that there is a great asymmetry in the number of times that the (2,1)
state arises (7 times) as opposed to the (1,2) state (27 times). These results are
tabulated in Table 1.
[Table 1 Here]
The time series presented in Figure 2 oﬀers strong evidence for the existence of
the punctuated equilibrium phenomenon. Regime I is clearly a period of time over
which the (2,2) equilibrium is ﬁrmly established. In fact, round 13 where both
row and column deviate simultaneously, does not seem to disrupt the convention
which continues for three more periods after this deviation occurs. What is then
surprising, in Regime II, is how completely this convention disappears never to
re-establish itself with any regularity until generations 67-81 (Regime IV). While
Regime II does not present as clear a picture of the existence of a convention (the
(1,1) outcome, while frequent, is not persistent), the absence of any (2,2) choices,
along with the appearance of 10 (1,1) choices in 21 generations and the persistent
choice of the row player for row 1, creates a strong case for dubbing it the (1,1)
Convention Regime. Regime IV, where it appears that the (2,2) convention has
reestablished itself also presents interesting evidence of the punctuated equilibrium
phenomenon.
A formal test of the proposition that there are diﬀerent conventions in place in
the regimes that we propose above can be constructed on the basis of an estimated
econometric model of the process determining the state. To do this, consider a
multinomial logit response model in which the probability of state h occurring
in generation t is estimated as a function of the recent history of play by the
row player and the column player. In the context of such a ﬁtted model, the
idea of punctuated conventions suggests that there is a structural change that
occurs in the model. That is, a sudden change (punctuation) in the estimated
coeﬃcients on the row and column player choice histories. Therefore, if we allow
the estimated coeﬃcients on the row and column player history variables to vary
across our proposed regimes, the resulting “unrestricted” model can be compared
to a restricted model in which the coeﬃcients on the row history variables and
column history variables (deﬁned for each regime) are restricted to be equal to one
another across regimes. For econometric purposes, we deﬁne only three distinct
structural regimes: one for Regimes I and IV where the (2,2) outcome is dominant
( i n d e x e db yk=1 ),o n ef o rR e g i m eI Iw h e r et h e( 1 , 1 )o u t c o m ei sd o m i n a n t
12( i n d e x e db yk=2 ),a n do n ef o rR e g i m eI I I ,w h e r en e i t h e re q u i l i b r i u mo u t c o m e
dominates (indexed by k = 3). A standard likelihood ratio test between the
restricted and unrestricted models serves as a test of structural change.
To substantiate our choice of regimes in a more formal manner, we ﬁrst es-
timated a multinomial logit model for the state on a moving average of the row
and column player choices . That is, the probability that any state is observed
in period t is a function of the relative frequencies with which the row and col-
umn players have used their various strategies over the last m period. Using a




























where k∈K ={1,2,3} indexes the 3 structural regimes deﬁned above, J is the
set of states indexed by j, h is any particular state ((2,2) is the base state).The
row history variables, rt,k, are deﬁned as follows. Let fm
t,rb et h er e l a t i v ef r e q u e n c y
with which the row player has chosen action 1 in the previous m periods before
t (periods (t-m-1) to (t-1)), and let dkbe a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
observed state in period t is in structural regime k, and equal zero otherwise.
Then rt,k = fm
t,rdk. The column history variables, ct,k,a r ed e ﬁned similarly. We













3c, implying that there are no structural regimes. The “unrestricted”
model allows these coeﬃcients to vary across structural regimes.
In the estimation we use m=5 to construct the row and column player history
variables. We decided on this by comparing the ﬁt for the restricted model for
diﬀerent values of m (from m = 1 to m = 10) on the basis of the pseudo R-
squared measure.12We then proceeded to estimate the unrestricted model , using
the ﬁve-period moving average, and computed the likelihood ratio test for the
restrictions.
The restricted and unrestricted estimates are contained in Table A1 in the ap-
pendix. Since the coeﬃcients are not of particular interest here, we focus on the
12Speciﬁcally, the pseudo R-squared = .17 for the ﬁve period moving average, and it declined
as one either lengthened or shortened the moving average window, where we allowed the window
to range from m=1 to m=10.
13goodness of ﬁt measures and the likelihood ratio test for the structural change hy-
pothesis. Table 2 summarizes these results 13 Note that each model is signiﬁcant:
the model chi square rejects the hypothesis that all coeﬃcients but the constant
terms are zero in each case. The likelihood ratio chi square for the structural
change hypothesis is also signiﬁcant: the restriction that coeﬃcients are equal
across regimes is rejected at the 4% signiﬁcance level.
[Table 2 Here]
The estimated probabilities for the equilibrium states (1,1) and (2,2) derived
from the unrestricted estimated multinomial logit model are presented in Figure
3.
Figure 3 Here
This ﬁgure presents strong evidence that behavior changed dramatically as
generations moved across our regimes. For example, note that in our Regime I
the probability of being in state (2,2) approaches .90 for a substantial portion of
time and then drops precipitously as the experiment enters our Regime II. In fact,
during almost the entire length of our Regime II that probability is practically
zero indicating, as we did above, that the (2,2) equilibrium abruptly disappears
in our Regime II. Note however, the re-emergence of the (2,2) state in our Regime
IV.
The evidence for the (1,1) state is less strong but still convincing. Note here
that the initial probability of being in state (1,1) in Regime I is practically zero
for the ﬁrst 25 generations and then rises to almost .50 for regime II only to
disappear once more for the remainder of the experiment. The abrupt changes in
the probability of the (2,2) state as we cross our regime boundaries along with the
low probabilities for the (1,1) state in all but our Regime II we claim as support
for our division of generations into regimes using our ”eyeball metric”.
13Since there are 3 equations to estimate (one less than the total number of states) there
are, besides the constant terms, 2 (row and column history) x 3 (equations) x 3 (regimes) = 18
coeﬃcients to estimate in the unrestricted model, and 2 (row and column history) x 3 (equations)
=6c o e ﬃcients to estimate in the restricted model, apart from the constant terms. Thus the
goodness of ﬁt chi-squared statistic has 18 degrees of freedom for the unrestricted model and
6 degrees of freedom for the restricted model, while the chi-squared statistic for the test of
structural change has 18-6=12 degrees of freedom.
143.2.2. Inertia and norms of inequality
With respect to inertia, there are really two types of social inertia one can dis-
cuss. One, which we will call equilibrium inertia, is the inertia that leads people
to adhere to a convention simply because it has existed for a long time in the
past despite the fact that it may not be the best equilibrium for their particular
group. For example, in our experiment the (2,2) convention is obviously the best
convention for the column chooser. Hence, when a row player enters the game
and observes, (as in Regime I) that this convention has been in place for a very
long time, and hence is likely to be chosen by the other side, there are a great
many forces leading a such a player to continue adhering to the convention. Given
these forces, it is actually surprising that the (2,2) convention ever disappeared
after round 24. In fact, if the (2,2) convention is a strong convention where each
player thinks that his or her opponent is going to adhere with probability 1, then
deviating can never be beneﬁcial since if you continue to adhere you will get 50
today plus one half of ﬁfty tomorrow, while deviating will yield 0 today and if
successful in breaking the (2,2) convention and shifting it to the (1,1) convention
in period t=1 (an event that is rather unlikely given that we are talking about a
strong convention), then the player will get one half of 150 tomorrow. In either
case, the payoﬀ will be 75 so that there is no positive incentive to deviate unless
one cares about generations beyond next period, a consideration that was ruled
out by our inter-generational utility function. (We will be able to explain this
disappearance later when we talk about advice).
Note that such conventions establish what Edna Ullman-Margalit (1977) calls
“norms of partiality” in which seemingly symmetric agents select an equilibrium
to a game which favors one type of agent and then pass this norm or what we
call convention on to succeeding generations. The point is that the agents be-
ing favored today are no more worthy of preferential treatment than are their
cohorts yet a quirk of history (a path dependency) has given one mode of behav-
ior saliency. We suspect that the pressures to deviate from established equilibria
and the resulting punctuated equilibria discussed above is the result of pressures
that arise as one type of agent realizes that the cause of the inequality they face is
purely arbitrary and hence not fair. It appears as if subjects deviate to further the
cause of their type at a sacriﬁce to themselves. (Another violation of Darwinian
evolutionary theory.)14
14This conjecture is supported by the results of some of our pilot experiments run on gen-
erational subjects who played the game 10 times before being replaced. Such subjects easily
15Another type of social inertia exists when people are recalcitrant and persist
in behavior that is clearly detrimental to them. For example, in Regimes II and
III, the row players, apparently in an eﬀort to move the convention from (2,2) to
(1,1) which is better for them, persisted in choosing row 1 32 out of 42 generation
b e t w e e ng e n e r a t i o n2 5a n d6 6 .T h e yp e r s i s t e di nd o i n gs od e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a tt h i s
behavior led to a disequilibrium outcome in 25 of those generations. Obviously,
they felt that their eﬀorts might establish the (1,1) equilibrium favorable to them
as a convention even if they would not beneﬁt directly from it.
To give a diﬀerent picture of the persistence of both equilibrium and disequi-
librium states we calculated a continuation probability for each of our four states
in each of the regimes listed above. More precisely, a continuation probability
deﬁnes a conditional probability of being in any given state in period t+1 given
that you were in that state in period t.
Table 3 presents the probabilities:
[Table 3 Here]
Since conventions are persistent states our intention in presenting Table 3 is
to give some indication as to what states seem to form conventions in each of
these regimes. For example, in Regime 1 the (2,2) state is remarkably persistent
indicating a 0.81 probability of remaining in the (2,2) state if one reached it. In
Regime II, while the (1,1) state was observed 11 out of 21 times, many of these
instances were isolated instances that were not repeated. Still, the continuation
probability was 0.30. More remarkable is the fact that none of the other states
ever repeated themselves during the entire regime. Regime III demonstrated a
dramatic ability to remain in the disequilibrium state (16 out of 21 times) with no
persistence to the (2,1) state but a continuation probability for the (1,2) state of
0.50. Finally, Regime IV showed the return of the (2,2) state and its persistence (5
out of 9 times) while no other state appeared to have any durability whatsoever.
3.2.3. Socialization in the Baseline
The type of Lamarckian evolution we are interested in here relies heavily on a
process of social learning for its proper functioning. The transmission of conven-
established an alternating convention in which they successively alternate between choosing
(1,1) and (2,2). This has the eﬀect of equalizing the payoﬀs to subject types (row or column)
and makes adherence easier in the long run. The same pilots indicated that such conventions
do not get established when there are only 3 or 4 periods to a generations’s lifetime so there is
still work to be done here.
16tions and ”culture” through advice is permitted in our experiments and turns out
to be extremely important to the functioning of our experimental societies.
To discuss advice we will present a summary of how advice was given in Table
4, and under what circumstances it was followed Table 5.
[Tables 4 and 5 Here]
What Advice Was Given15 T a b l e4p r e s e n t st h et y p eo fa d v i c et h a tw a s
oﬀered subjects by their predecessors conditional on the state. Note the conser-
vatism of this advice. When a stage-game equilibrium state has been reached, no
matter which one, subjects overwhelmingly tell their successors to adhere to it.
For the row player this occurs 100% of the time (16 out of 16 times) when the
stage game equilibrium is the (1,1) equilibrium, the equilibrium that is best for
the row player, while it occurs 90% of the time, 27 out of 30 times, when the state
is (2,2). For the column player a similar pattern exists. When the state is (2,2),
that state which is best for the column player, we see 100% of the column players
(30 out of 30) suggesting a choice of 2, while when the state is (1,1) 87.5% of the
subjects suggest that their successors adhere to the (1,1) equilibrium despite the
fact that it gives the opponent the lion’s share of the earnings.
When the last period state was a disequilibrium state, behavior was more
erratic and diﬀered across row and column players. Note that there are two
types of disequilibrium states. In one, the (2,1) state, each subject chose in a
manner consistent with that equilibrium which was best for his or her opponent.
We call this the submissive disequilibrium state since both subjects yielded
to the other and chose that state which was best for his or her opponent. The
(1,2) state is the greedy disequilibrium state since here we get disequilibrium
behavior in which each subject chooses in a manner consistent with his or her
own best equilibrium. In the submissive disequilibrium state, (2,1), both the
row and column subjects overwhelmingly suggest a change of strategy for their
successors in which they suggest a greedy action next period. More precisely, in
the seven such instances of the submissive disequilibrium state, the row player
15In Schotter and Sopher (2000a) we investigate the content of the advice given by coding it
and investigating how it changes depending on the state of the game.. What we ﬁnd is that the
detail with which messages are written depends on the state of the game. When an equilibrium
state existed last period that determined a good outcome for a subject, i.e., they received a 150
payoﬀ, they tended to leave low level messages which were not supported by strategic reasoning.
However, the subject receiving the low payoﬀ tended to leave more highly reasoned and strategic
advice.
17gave advice to switch and choose row 1 in all seven instances while the column
player suggested switching and choosing 1 in ﬁve of the seven cases. When the
greedy disequilibrium state occurred, advice was more diﬀuse. In 18 of the 27
occurrences of this disequilibrium state, the row player suggested switching to the
submissive strategy of choosing row 2 while 9 suggested standing pat and choosing
row 1. For the column players 15 suggested switching to the submissive strategy
(column 1), while 12 suggested standing pat and continuing to choose column 2.
When Was Advice Followed In order for an equilibrium convention to per-
sist, it must be the case that either all generations advise their successors to follow
the convention and their advice is adhered to, or their advice deviates from the
dictates of the equilibrium and it is ignored. What we ﬁnd when we look at the
behavior of subjects is that they overwhelmingly tended to follow the advice they
were given but not suﬃciently strongly to prevent periodic deviations and hence
the punctuated equilibrium behavior we discussed above. More precisely, Table 5
presents the frequency with which advice was followed conditional on the state in
which it was given.
These tables present some interesting facts. First of all, advice appears to be
followed quite often but the degree to which it is followed varies depending on
the state last period. On average, for the row players it is followed 68.75% of the
time while for the column player it was followed 70% of the time. When the last
period state was (2,2), row players followed the advice given to them 73.3% of
the time (strangely agreeing to follow advice to switch to the row 1 strategy three
out of the three times), while column subjects followed 86.6% of the time (here
all advice was to choose column 2). When the last period state was the (1,1)
equilibrium, column subjects chose to follow it only 37.5% of the time while row
player adhered 68% of the time.
One question that arises here is how powerful is advice when compared to the
prescriptions of best response behavior. For example, it may be that subjects fol-
low advice so often because the advice they get is consistent with what their best
responses to their beliefs so following advice is simply equivalent to best respond-
ing. In our design we are fortunate in being able to test this hypothesis directly
since for each generation we have elicited their beliefs about their opponent and
hence know their best response and also the advice they have received. Hence it
is quite easy for us to compare them and this is what we do in Tables 6a and 6b:
[Tables 6a and 6b Here]
18What we can conclude from these tables is quite striking. When advice and
best responses diﬀer, subjects are about as likely to follow the dictates of their best
responses as they are those of the advice they are given. For example, for the row
players there were 28 instances where the best response prescription was diﬀerent
than the advice given and of those 28 instances the advice was followed 15 times.
For the column players there were 34 such instances and in 17 of them the column
player chose to follow advice and not to best respond. These results are striking
since the beliefs we measured were the players posterior beliefs after they had both
seen the advice given to them and the history of play before them. Hence, our
beliefs should have included any informational content contained in the advice
subjects were given yet half of the time they still persisted in making a choice
that was inconsistent with their best response. Since advice in this experiment
was a type of private cheap talk based on little more information than the next
generation already posses (the only informational diﬀerence between a generation
t and generation t+1 player is the fact that the generation t player happened to
have played the game once and received advice from his predecessor which our
generation t+1 player did not see directly) it is surprising it was listened to at all.
One of the striking aspects to this advice giving and advice receiving behavior
is how it introduces a stochastic aspect into what would otherwise be a determinis-
tic best-response process. If advice was always followed, or at least followed when
it agreed with a subjects’ best response and if beliefs were such that both subjects
would want to choose actions consistent with the (1,1) (or (2,2) state, then these
states, once reached, would be absorbing. However, we see that neither of these
assumptions is supported by our data. Despite the fact that the (2,2) state was
observed nine times in a row in regime 1, and despite the fact that choosing 2
was a best response to subjects stated beliefs, we observed in generation 13 a
completely unexplained deviation. In addition, 3 of the 30 rounds where the (2,2)
equilibrium was in place, the row player chose not to give advice to his successor
to adhere to it, while in 2 of 16 instances where the (1,1) equilibrium was in place
the column subject chose to oﬀer advice to choose 2. Such behavior makes the
process we are investigating more complex and, as we will see, leads us to model
it as an irreducible ﬁnite state Markov chain.
3.3. Beliefs
As described above, before each generational subject makes his or her choice,
they were asked to state their beliefs about what they felt the probability was
19that their opponent would use strategies 1 or 2. The time path of these belief
vectors are presented in Figures 4a and 4b where we present the probability that
each generational subject felt his opponent would choose strategy 1.
[Figure 4a and 4b here]
Note that in Figures 4a and 4b we have placed a straight line which indicates
the critical belief value which is such that if the beliefs that your opponent is
going to choose strategy 1 with a higher probability that than critical value, a
best response for you is to choose strategy 1 as well. (We have also placed a curved
line which we will explain shortly but which we will ignore at the moment). As we
see, beliefs of both subjects seem to exhibit a type of over-conﬁdence bias in the
sense that overwhelmingly both subjects appear to believe that their opponent is
going to choose that strategy which is consistent with that equilibrium which is
best for them. More precisely, in only 26 on the 81 generations did row subjects
believe that their opponent was so likely to choose row 2 so as to lead them to
choose 2 as a best response. For column players the situation was even worse with
beliefs only consistent with 15 row-1 best responses. Obviously, if these beliefs
are based on the history of play of the game, each can not be correct.
To demonstrate how historical beliefs would diﬀe r ,w eh a v ec a l c u l a t e dt h e
empirical beliefs of subjects in this game (i.e. beliefs that the probability that a
player will play a strategy is equal to the fraction of time that player has played
that strategy in the past) and superimposed them on the graphs as well. While
empirical beliefs are a very drastic form of historical belief, giving equal weight to
each past observation, they still may be useful as a point of contrast to the stated
beliefs we received from our subjects. As we can see, there is little connection
between these historical (empirical) beliefs and the stated beliefs of our subjects.
(These results replicate the same ﬁnding for repeated zero sum games presented
previously in Nyarko and Schotter (1998)). As we see, for the row players the
empirical beliefs seem to do a good job at converging to the theoretical equilibrium
beliefs as time proceeds while the column player empirical beliefs appear to be
converging to a value considerably less than the theoretical equilibrium value.
In either case, however, subject beliefs appear to be more optimistic about the
chances of achieving one’s preferred equilibrium than is warranted by the data.
In fact for the row player we can reject the hypothesis of the equality of the dis-
tributions of stated and empirical beliefs for the 81 generations of the experiment
(p = 0.00), (z = 4.93). There appears to be some convergence, however, since
in Regimes III and IV these same Signed-Rank tests fail to reject the hypothesis
20that the distributions are equal (Regime III: z= 1.34, p-value 0.18: Regime IV: z
= -.34, p-value 0.73).
For column players, a Signed-Ranks test fails to reject the hypothesis that the
distributions of stated and empirical beliefs are equal either over the entire 81
generation horizon (z = 0.39, p-value 0.70) of the experiment or in any of the
Regimes, (Regime I, z = 0.70, p-value 0.48, Regime II , z = 1.55, p-value 0.12,
Regime III, z = -1.16, p-value 0.24,. Regime IV, z = -1.36, p-value 0.17.
4. The Advice Puzzle: Social and Belief Learning in Treat-
ments I and II.
Starting in generation 52 we introduced two new treatments into our experiment.
In Treatment I we ”took away history” by having successive generations of players
play without the beneﬁt of being able to see any history beyond that of their
parent generation. What this means is that subjects performing this experiment
knew only that the game they were playing had been played before, possibly many
times, but that they could only see the play of the generation before them. They
could, however, receive advice just as did subjects in our Baseline. This treatment
was run independently of the Baseline and Treatment II, except for the common
staring point in period 52. In Treatment II we ”took away advice” by allowing
subjects to view the entire history of play before them, if they wished, but not
allowing them to advise the next generation. 16
These treatments furnish a controlled experiment which allows us to inves-
tigate the impact of social learning, in the form of advice giving and following,
on subjects’ ability to attain and maintain an equilibrium convention of behavior
in this game. Such learning is in contrast to the more frequently studied belief
learning which involves agents taking actions which at any time are best responses
to the beliefs they have about the actions of their opponents. In our experiment
we can easily test these two types of learning since we have elicited the beliefs
of agents at each point during the game. Hence, if each generation forms their
beliefs in light of history and then best responds to them, the addition of advice
should have no impact on the frequency and persistence of equilibrium behavior
among the subjects. This is especially true since in our experiments the people
giving advice barely have more information at their disposal than do the ones
16This was done by forbidding them to write any instructions on the screen despite the fact
that they were prompted to.
21receiving it . (The only diﬀerence in their information sets is that the advice giver
has received advice from his or her parental generation which the receiver has not
seen.)
More precisely, if advice giving were not essential to convention building, then
we should not observe any diﬀerence in the number of times our subjects achieved
an equilibrium when we compare Treatment II, (the full history/no-advice exper-
iment) to our Baseline experiment, where subjects had access to both. Further-
more, if history was not essential for coordination but advice was, then eliminating
history and allowing advice, as we did in Treatment I, should lead to identical
amounts of cooperation as observed in the Baseline.
Figures 5a-5c plots the time series generated by these two treatments along
with our original Baseline treatment (a repeat of Figure 2).
[Figures 5a-5c here]
As we can see from these graphs, removing history has a very diﬀerent impact
on the path of play than does removing advice. Consistent with what we have
noticed above, players in inter-generational games appear much more successful
in achieving equilibrium behavior (or establishing a convention) when advice is
present even if they have no access to the history of play before them. History,
with no accompanying advice, appears to furnish less of a guide to coordinated
behavior. More precisely, as we see, Treatment I was successful in reaching a stage-
game equilibrium in 39 out of 80 generations and when equilibrium was reached
subjects maintained it on average for 1.95 generations in a row. (The continuation
probability was 20
39 = .512). In Treatment II equilibria to the stage game appeared
rather infrequently, in just 19 out of 66 generations with a continuation probability
of .315 and a mean persistence of 1.58. Hence, there is a dramatic drop in the
frequency of coordination when advice is removed. While in the Baseline we
observe equilibrium outcomes 47 out of 81 time, when we eliminate advice, as we
do in Treatment II, we only observe coordination in 19 out of 66 periods. When
we allow advice but remove history, Treatment I, coordination is restored and
occurs in 39 out of 81 generations.17
17A more formal way to compare the impact of these treatments on the behavior of our
subjects is to compare the state-to-state transition matrices generated by our Baseline data and
test to see if they were generated by the same stochastic process generating the data observed
in Treatments I and II. More precisely, treating the data as if it were generated by a one-state
Markov chain, for each experiment we can estimate the probability of transiting from any of
our four states {(1,1), (1,2), (2,1) and (2,2)} to the other. A simple counting procedure turns
22These results raise what we call the ”Advice Puzzle” which is composed of
two parts. Part 1 is the question of why subjects would follow the advice of
someone whose information set contains virtually the same information as theirs.
In fact, the only diﬀerence between the information sets of parents and children
in our Baseline Experiment is the advice that parents received from their parents.
Other than that, all information is identical yet our subjects defer to their parent’s
advice almost 50% of the time when the advice diﬀers from the best response to
their own beliefs. 18
Part 2 of our paradox is the puzzle that despite the fact that advice is pri-
vate and not common knowledge cheap talk, as in Cooper, Dejong, Forsythe and
Ross (1989), it appears to aid coordination in the sense that the amount of equi-
librium occurrences in our Baseline (58%) and Treatment I (49%) where advice
was present is far greater than that of Treatment II (29%) where no advice was
present. While it is known that one-way communication in the form of cheap
talk can increase coordination in Battle of the Sexes Games (see Cooper et al.
(1989)), and that two-way cheap talk can help in other games, (see Cooper, De-
jong, Forsythe and Ross (1992)), how private communication of the type seen in
our experiment works is an unsolved puzzle for us.
Finally, note that the desire of subjects to follow advice has some of the charac-
teristics of an information cascade since in many cases subjects are not relying on
their own beliefs, which are based on the information contained in the history of
the game, but are instead following the advice given to them by their predecessor
out to yield maximum-likelihood estimates of these transition probabilities. Doing so would
generate a 4 x 4 transition matrix for each experimental treatment. These transition matrices
are presented in the Appendix to Schotter and Sopher (2000a).
To test if the transition probabilities deﬁned by our Baseline data are generated by a process
equivalent to the one that generated the data in Treatments I and II we use a χ2 goodness of ﬁt
test. More precisely, call T the transition matrix estimated from our Baseline data and Pk the
transition matrix deﬁned by our kth treatment, i.e., k = {I, II}. Denote pPk
ij ,j= i = {1,2,3,4},
as the transition probability from state i to state j in matrix Pk. To test whether the transition
probabilities estimated for any one of our treatments has been generated by a process with
transition probabilities equal to those of our Baseline experiment, we eomply a chi-square test
(See Schotter and Sopher (2000a) for details). We ﬁnd that we can reject the hypothesis that
the same process that generated the Baseline data also generated the data observed in either
Treatment I (χ2(12df ) = 27.6521, (p= 0.000)) or Treatment II ((χ2(9df ) = 59.4262, (p= 0.000)).
Hence, if the process generating our data can be considered Markovian, it would appear as if
imposing diﬀerent informational conditions on the subject signiﬁcantly changed their behavior.
18There is no sense, then, that parents in our experiment are in any way ”experts” as in the
model of Ottaviani and Sorensen (1999).
23w h oi sa sj u s ta b o u tm u c han e o p h y t ea st h e ya r e .
5. Conclusions
This paper, utilized an experimental approach to investigate the process of con-
vention creation and transmission in inter-generational games. It has modeled
the process as a Lamarckian one in which non-overlapping generations of players
create and pass on conventions of behavior from generation to generation. These
conventions tend to perpetuate social inequality. Since the process is stochas-
tic, however, it exhibits punctuated equilibria in which conventions are created,
passed on from one generation to the next, but then spontaneously disappear. In
this process several stylized facts appear.
Probably the most notable feature of our results is the central role that the
advice, passed on from one generation to the next, plays in facilitating coordina-
tion across and between generations. It appears that relying on history and the
process of belief learning is not suﬃcient to allow proper coordination in the Bat-
tle of the Sexes Game played by our subjects. For a reason yet left unexplained,
advice, even in the absence of history, appears to be suﬃcient for the creation of
conventions while history, in the absence of advice, does not. This implies that
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26Table 1: Choices of Row and Column
Player by Regime
Choices by States and Regime
Regimes (1,1) (1,2) (2,1) (2,2) Total
I 2 5 0 17 24
II 11 6 3 1 21
III 2 13 3 3 21
IV 1 3 1 10 15
Total 16 27 7 31 81
Choices by Regime
Regime Row 1 Row 2 Column 1 Column 2
I 7 17 2 22
II 17 4 14 7
III 15 6 5 16
IV 4 11 2 13
Total 43 38 23 58
Table 2: Test for Structural Change
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
N7 6 7 6
Model X2 54.15 (18 d.o.f.) 32.26 (6 d.o.f.)
Prob>X2 .00 .00
Log Likelihood -70.30 -81.25
Pseudo R2 .28 .17
LR Test for Structural Change: X2 =21.89 (12 d.o.f.)
Prob> X2.04
27Table 3: Continuation Probabilities by Regime
1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2
Regime I: 00 .166 NA∗ 0.812
Regime II: 0.30 0 0
Regime III: 00 .50 0 0.33
Regime IV: 000 0 .555
Total 0.187 0.259 0 0.633
*No (2,1) state occurred in Regime I
Table 4: Advice Oﬀered Conditional of the State
State Row 1 Row 2 Column 1 Column 2
1,1 16 0 14 2
1,2 91 8 1 5 1 2
2,1 70 2 5
2,2 32 8 0 3 1
28Table 5: Advice Adherence Conditional
on Last Period’s State
State Last Period: (1,1)
Row Player Column Player
Followed Rejected Followed Rejected
11 1 5 5 9
Advice 20 0 1 1
Total 11 5 6 10
State Last Period: (1,2)
Row Player Column Player
Followed Rejected Followed Rejected
17 2 1 0 5
Advice 21 0 8 1 0 2
Total 17 10 20 7
State Last Period: (2,1)
Row Player Column Player
Followed Rejected Followed Rejected
15 2 0 2
Advice 20 0 4 1
Total 5 2 4 3
State Last Period: (2,2)
Row Player Column Player
Followed Rejected Followed Rejected
13 0 0 0
Advice 21 9 8 2 6 4
Total 22 8 26 4
29Table 6a: Following Advice When Advice and
Best Responses Diﬀer
Row Column
Follow Reject Follow Reject
State Last Period (1, 1) 0338
State Last Period (1, 2) 451 1 6
State Last Period (2, 1) 0002
State Last Period (2, 2) 11 5 3 1
15 13 17 17
Table 6b: Following Advice When Advice
Equals Best Responses
Row Column
Follow Reject Follow Reject
State Last Period (1, 1) 11 2 3 2
State Last Period (1, 2) 13 5 9 1
State Last Period (2, 1) 5241
State Last Period (2, 2) 11 3 23 3
40 12 39 7
30Table A1: Coeﬁcient Estimates for Test for Structural Change*
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
State=Row Equilibrium (1,1) Estimate (Prob.> z) Estimate (Prob.> z)
Constant term -2.18 (.03) -3.21 (.00)
Row History, regime 1 2.68 (.39) 3.27 (.08)
Row History, regime 2 2.70 (.65)
Row History, regime 3 6.09 (.09)
Column History, regime 1 -3.40 (.52) 3.56 (.09)
Column History, regime 2 4.03 (.60)
Column History, regime 3 -9.69 (.35)
State= Selﬁsh (1,2)
Constant term -2.01 (.02) -2.35 (.00)
Row History, regime 1 -0.12 (.97) 3.14 (.05)
Row History, regime 2 -1.48 (.81)
Row History, regime 3 4.87 (.04)
Column History, regime 1 4.63 (.23) 2.73 (.00)
Column History, regime 2 8.02 (.31)
Column History, regime 3 0.76 (.85)
State=Altruist (2,1)
Constant term -4.80 (.03) -5.87 (.00)
Row History, regime 1 0.58 (.92) 7.21 (.00)
Row History, regime 2 11.51 (.15)
Row History, regime 3 9.90 (.01)
Column History, regime 1 8.69 (.25) 0.95 (.72)
Column History, regime 2 -6.44 (.58)
Column History, regime 3 -10.22 (.34)
* Column Equilibrium (2,2) is the baseline state
31Figure 6.1:
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Outcomes:   1 = (Row chooses 1, Column chooses 1) 
        2 = (Row chooses 1, Column chooses 2) 
         3 = (Row chooses 2, Column chooses 1) 
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EquilibrriumFigure 5a: Baseline Outcomes 
 





















1 4 7 1 01 31 61 92 22 52 83 13 43 74 04 34 64 95 25 55 86 16 4APPENDIX : INSTRUCTIONS 
The following are the instructions to the Battle of the Sexes Game as they appeared on the computer 
screen for subjects.  They are preceded by a set of general instructions, which explain the overall 
procedures for the three games each subject was to play. After a subject finished playing this game 
he would proceed to another game (unless this was the last game he played).  
Since these are generic instructions things like conversion rate of experimental currency to 






You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision making.  Various research 
foundations have provided the money to conduct this research.  If you follow the instructions and make 




The currency used in this experiment is francs.  All monetary amounts will be denominated in this 
currency.  Your earnings in francs will be converted into U.S. Dollars at an exchange rate to be described 
later.  Details of how you will make decisions and earn money, and how you will be paid, will be provided 
below. 
 
The Decision Problem 
 
In this experiment, you will participate in three distinct decision problems.  In each problem, you will be 
paired with another person and you will each make decisions.  The monetary payoff that you receive 
depends upon the decisions that you make and upon the decisions that the person you are paired with 
makes. 
 
After you have played the first decision problem, you will then be paired with another person, different 
from the one you were first paired with, to play a second game.  Again, your payoff in this second decision 
problem will depend upon the decisions that you make and upon the decisions that the person you are 
paired with makes. 
 
After you have participated in the second decision problem, you will once more be paired with another 
person, different from either of the people you were paired with in the first two decision problems.  Your 
payoff in this third decision problem will, again, depend upon the decisions that you make and upon the 
decisions that the person you are paired with makes. 
 
You will never be informed of the identity of any of the people you are paired with, nor will any of them be 
informed of your identity. 
 
The details of the three different decision problems that you will participate in will be briefly described to 
you just prior to each decision problem.  What follows here is a general description of the structure of the 




In general, you and the person you are paired with will not be the first pair who has participated in a 
particular decision problem.  That is, in general, other pairs will have participated  before you, either earlier 
today, or on previous days. Further, you and the person you are paired with will not be the last pair to 
participate in the decision problem.  That is, other pairs will participate in the decision problem after you, 
either later today or on later days. 
 Roles 
 
In each decision problem, you will be replacing a person who has participated before you.  In each decision 




In each decision problem, you will make a decision and the person you are paired with will make a 
decision, and these decisions will determine your payoff from playing the decision problem.  In addition, 
you will also receive a payment equal to a fraction of the earnings made by your replacement when he/she 
takes your place.  (Your predecessor will also be earning a payment equal to a fraction of what you earn). 
Thus, a player's total payoff from any particular decision problem is the sum of the earnings from the 
decision problem one plays with the person one is paired with, plus a payment equal to a fraction of the 
earnings from the decision problem one's successor plays with the successor of the person one is paired 




Since, in general, your total payoff depends on your own decision and on the decision of the person who 
succeeds you in your role in a decision problem, you will be allowed to pass on advice on what action to 
take in the decision problem to your successor.  The person you are paired with will also be allowed to pass 
on advice to his/ her successor.  The person who was in your role when the last decision problem was 
played will be able to leave you advice on what action to take in the decision problem. Similarly, the person 
who was in the role of the person you are paired with when the decision problem was last played will have 




Since others have participated in a decision problem before you, you will be able to see some part of the 
history of the actions taken in the decision problem before you.  Specifically, you and the person you  are 




At various points in the decision problem, prior to making a decision, you will be asked how likely you 
believe it is that your opponent is going to taken any given action in the decision problem.  To give you the 
incentive to state your beliefs as accurately as possible, you will be compensated according to how accurate 
your stated beliefs are, in light of what your opponent ends up doing.  The details of how you will be 
compensated will depend on which decision problem you are participating in.  Details of how you will be 
compensated will thus be deferred until the specific instructions for the different decision problems. 
 
How you get paid 
 
You will receive $5 simply for showing up today and completing the experiment.  You will receive, in 
addition, a payment today based on the outcome of the three decision problems you participate in. A second 
payment, based on the outcome of the three decision problems of your successors, will be available at a 







In this decision problem you will be paired with another person. When your participation in this decision 
problem is over, you will be replaced by another participant who will take your place in this decision 
problem. Your final payoff in the entire decision problem will be determined both by  your payoff in the decision problem you participate in and by the payoff of your successor in the decision problem he/she 
participates in. 
 
The currency in this decision problem is called francs. All payoffs are denominated in this currency. At the 
end of the decision problem your earnings in francs will be converted into real U.S. dollars at a rate of 1 
franc = $x.xx. 
 
Your Decision Problem 
In the decision problem you participate in there will be %r round(s). In each round, every participant will 
engage in the following decision problem where you will either play the role of the Asender@ or 
Areceiver@. (Which type you are will be told to you before your participation in the decision problem 
begins): 
 
In this problem the row  chooser must choose a row and the column chooser must choose a column. There 
are two rows (1 and 2) and two columns (1 and 2) available to choose from and depending on the choices 
of the row and column choosers,  a payoff is determined. For example, if the row chooser chooses 1 and the 
column chooser also chooses 1, then the payoffs will be the ones written in the upper left hand corner of the 
matrix. (Note that the first number is the payoff for the row chooser while the second number is the payoff 
for the column chooser). Here the row chooser will earn a payoff of 150 while the column chooser will earn 
50. If the row chooser chooses 2 and the column chooser also chooses 2, then the payoffs will be the ones 
written in the lower right  hand corner of the matrix. Here the row chooser will earn a payoff of 50 while 
the column chooser will earn 150. If 1 is chosen by a row chooser and 2 by a column chooser (or vise 
versa), each chooser will get a payoff of zero. 
 
To make your decisions you will use a computer. If you are the row (column) chooser and want to choose 
any specific row (column), all you need to do is use the mouse to click on any portion of the row (column) 
you wish to choose. This will highlight the row (column)  you have chosen. You will then be asked to 
confirm your choice by being asked: 
 
Are you sure you want to select row(column) 1(2, 3, etc.)? 
 
When the row and column choosers have both confirmed their choices, the results of your choices will be 
reported to both choosers. At this point the computer will display your choice, your pair member's choice, 
and your payoff for that round by highlighting the row and column choices made and having the payoffs in 
the selected cell of the matrix blink. 
 
Your payoff and your successor 
 
After you have finished your participation in this decision problem, you will  be replaced by another 
participant who will take your place in an identical decision problem with another newly recruited 
participant. Your final payoff for this decision problem will be determined both by  your payoff in the 
decision problem you participate in and by the payoff of your successor in the decision problem that he/she 
participates in. More specifically, you will earn the sum of your payoffs in the decision problem you 
participate in plus an amount equal to (1/2) of the payoff of  your successor in his/her decision problem. 
 
Advice to your successor 
 
You will also receive one-half of the payment earned by your successor. Since your payoff depends on how 
your successor behaves, we will allow you to give advice to your successor in private. The form of this 
advice is simple.  You simply suggest an action, 1 or 2, or 3 etc. for you successor by writing in the advice 
form below what you think he/she should choose.  You are also provided with a space where you can write 
any comments you have for them about the choice they should make. In addition, you can, if you wish, tell 
your successor the advice given to you by your predecessor as well as any history of your predecessors 
which you saw but your successor might not see. 
 To give advice, click on the “Leave the Advice!” button. You will then  see on the screen the following 
advice form which provides you an opportunity to give advice to your successor. 
 
Note that except if you are the first person ever to do this decision problem, when you sit down at your 





When you sit down at your computer you will also see the history of all previous pairs who have 
participated in this decision problem before. 
 
To see this history information click on the “History” button located at the bottom of the Advice Box. 
Note, finally, that all other successors will also see the advice of their predecessors, and the history of the 
decision problem that their predecessors participated in. You will not, however, see the advice given to the 
person you are paired with by his/her predecessor. 
 
Predicting Other People's Choices 
 
At the beginning of the decision problem, before you choose your row or column, you will be given an 
opportunity to earn additional money by predicting the choices of your pair member in the decision 
problem. A prediction form will appear when you need to make a prediction as follows: 
 
This form allow you to make a prediction of the choice of your pair member  
by indicating what the chances are that your pair member (the column or row chooser)  will choose 1, or 2, 
or 3, etc. For example, suppose you are a row chooser and you think there is a 40% chance that your pair 
member will choose 1, and hence a 60% chance that 2 will be chosen. This indicates that you believe that 1 
is less likely to be chosen than 2, but that there is still a pretty good chance of 1 being chosen. If this is your 
belief about the likely choice of your pair member, then click in the space next to the entry 1 and type the 
number (40). Then click in the space provided next to the entry 2 and type (60). Note that the numbers you 
write must sum up to 100.  For example, if you think there is a 67% chance that your pair member will 
choose 1 and a 33% chance he/she will choose 2, type 67 in the space next to the entry 1 and 33 in the 
space next to the entry 2. 
 
At the end of the decision problem, we will look at the choice actually made by your pair member and 
compare his/her choice to your predictions. We will then pay you for your prediction as follows: 
 
Suppose you predict that your pair member will choose 1 with a 60% chance and 2 with a 40% chance. In 
that case you will place 60 next to the entry 1 and 40 next to the entry 2. Suppose now that your pair 
member actually chooses 2. In that case your payoff will be 
 
Prediction Payoff = [20,000 - (100 - 40)
2   - (60)
 2 ] 
 
In other words, we will give you a fixed amount of 20,000 points from which we will subtract an amount 
which depends on how innacurate your prediction was. To do this when we find out what choice your pair 
member has made (i.e. either accept or reject), take the number you assigned to that choice, in this case 40 
on reject, subtract it from 100 and square it. We will then take the number you assigned to the choice not 
made by your pair member, in this case the 60 you assigned to accept, and square it also. These two 
squared numbers will then be subtracted from the 20,000 francs we initially gave you to determine your 
final point payoff.  Your point payoff will then be converted into francs at the rate of 1 point = %f francs. 
 
Note that the worst you can do under this payoff scheme is to state that you believe that there is a 100% 
chance that a certain action is going to be taken and assign 100 to that choice when in fact the other choice 
is made. Here your payoff from prediction would be 0. Similarly, the best you can do is to guess correctly 
and assign 100 to that choice which turns out to be the actual choice chosen. Here your payoff will be 
20,000.  
However since your prediction is made before you know what your pair member actually will choose, the 
best thing you can do to maximize the expected size of your prediction payoff is to simply state your true 
beliefs about what you think you pair member will do. Any other prediction will decrease the amount you 




In summation, this decision problem will proceed as follows. When you sit down at the terminal you will 
be able to see the decisions that have been made by the previous pairs who have participated in this 
decision problem, and you will be able to see the advice that your immediate predecessor has given you. 
You will then be asked to predict what you pair member will do by filling out the prediction form. After 
you do that, the decision box will appear on the screen and you will be prompted to make your decision. 
You will then be shown the decision made by the person you are paired with, and you will be informed of 
your payoff. Finally, you will fill out the advice form for your successor. 
 
 